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The effects of ownership identity on corporate diversification strategy of Chinese 
companies in foreign markets 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we examine the impact of acquirer’s ownership identity on corporate 
diversification decisions of Chinese companies in their cross-border acquisitions. Few studies 
to date have looked at the effect of ownership on corporate decisions to diversify abroad, 
particularly in the emerging market context. We find that certain characteristics of acquirer’s 
ownership identity such as the government ownership, business group membership and being 
publicly traded will be negatively linked with industry diversification in international markets. 
Also, the effects of ownership identities are contingent upon the host country selection, and 
acquisitions into developed host countries are likely to be in unrelated industries. We observe 
that Chinese companies that buy in developed markets engage in global consolidation. These 
results support our arguments on domestic market protection strategies adopted by the Chinese 
companies for mitigating competition from their developed market rivals. 
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Introduction  
Chinese multinational enterprises (CMNEs) have used cross-border acquisitions as a strategic 
tool to enter foreign markets (Buckley, Yu, Liu, Munjal & Tao, 2016a; Chen & Young, 2010; 
Cui & Jiang, 2012; Erdener & Shapiro, 2005; Huang & Renyong, 2014; Nicholson & Salaber, 
2013) as well as have used this process to diversify into other industries (Lu, Liu & Wang, 
2011; Ramamurti, 2008). However, few studies have looked at the decision of industrial 
diversification in an international context for CMNEs. Industrial diversification implies that 
firms will target firms belonging to industry different to their own, and in this paper, it means 
CMNEs are buying unrelated targets in a different industry to theirs in the foreign markets. For 
example, Haier’s acquisition of GE Appliances is a related acquisition as they are in the same 
industry, whereas, property giant Wanda’s acquisition of Legendary Entertainment production 
company is a case of industrial diversification in the foreign markets as they are in an unrelated 
line of business. Industrial diversification in a foreign country will require major commitments 
as it will require an overhaul of current corporate strategies to reap the potential benefits. 
Otherwise, potential synergy is limited at best due to the cross-country differences and costs of 
international diversification (Tallman & Li, 1996). Entering unrelated industry abroad is 
extremely risky when firms do not have enough experience to deal with the liability of 
foreignness in the host country and liability of newness in the new industry (Lu & Beamish, 
2004). Firm characteristics may play a role here. To be specific, corporate ownership has been 
recognized as a considerable impact on internationalization (Oesterle, Richta & Fisch, 2013). 
Therefore, internationalization and diversification strategies are largely influenced by firm 
ownership characteristics. So, we argue that most prior studies examining corporate 
diversification strategies do not consider the overall effect of home and host institutional 
environments and typology of heterogeneity of different types of firms that are making these 
decisions. Therefore, in this paper, we will build up a theoretical framework on how ownership 
identities of firms might determine the choice of industry diversification abroad. To be specific, 
we will examine the impact of ownership identities on CMNEs industrial diversification in 
cross-border acquisitions.  
The home country institutional environment we choose to focus on, i.e., China is an 
emerging market. These firms from China face several challenges when they are investing and 
expanding their business operations. Also, CMNEs are deeply embedded in their institutional 
environment, and they usually have limited experience in international activities (Chen & 
Young, 2010; Child & Marinova, 2014). To avoid excessive risk, some companies may decide 
to enter a foreign country, or a different industry step by step by leveraging their business 
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networks and incremental knowledge of foreign markets, and they are less likely to combine 
both international diversification and industrial diversification strategies (Meyer & 
Thaijongrak, 2013). Thus, the home country context offers an excellent opportunity to examine 
the strategic choices of industry relatedness in a foreign country. We argue that for Chinese 
firms entering an unrelated industry in the foreign market may be a particularly challenging 
decision that is not necessarily beneficial for the company. On the contrary, entering the same 
sector in foreign markets not only facilitates potential growth but also offers synergy in critical 
strategic assets (Rui & Yip, 2008). 
The role of corporate ownership identities is especially relevant in the context of China 
because institutional voids in home countries would lead to the importance of monitoring at 
the firm-level (Choi, Yoshikawa, Zahra & Han, 2014). Thus, some ownership identities (such 
as business group, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)) that are not common in advanced 
countries are typical in China. It is important to note that in the original framework of Luo, and 
Tung (2007) on cross-border acquisitions, they excluded SOEs. So, the heterogeneity among 
different types of Chinese firms has not been extensively explored. We focus on whether 
ownership identities such as government ownership, membership of a business group, and 
publicly-listed status will impact the industry diversification strategy of the Chinese companies 
in foreign markets.  
To fill in the research gap on CMNEs’ cross-border industry diversification, we will 
focus on a sample of mainland Chinese firms acquiring targets in developed and developing 
countries. We also examine whether the ownership characteristics of the acquiring firms could 
potentially explain the Chinese acquisitions beyond their core sectors. We find that the 
government ownership has a negative impact on the firm's tendency to diversify abroad. We 
also observe similar results for companies that are part of business groups or publicly listed on 
a stock exchange, i.e., they are less likely to acquire targets in different sectors than their own. 
Finally, we find that the effects of acquirer’s ownership identity are linked to the host country 
selection and diversification choice.  
This paper makes several significant contributions. Firstly, we contribute to the 
literature on cross-border industry diversification by introducing the international dimension. 
The foreign acquisition is often seen as a risky way to put a corporate strategy into action 
(Datta, Pinches & Narayanan, 1992; Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006). The implications of 
entering a foreign country while diversifying into a new industry at the same time will be 
difficult for most firms. By combining these two different streams of literature on 
diversification, our results add an international dimension to the industry diversification 
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literature (Hautz, Mayer & Stadler, 2013). Secondly, we examine the role of ownership 
identities on diversification strategies. Different types of firms will tend to follow different 
rationale and motivations, and make disparate decisions regarding industrial diversification 
while entering foreign markets through acquisitions. In spite of the vital role of ownership in 
firm strategies in emerging markets, prior studies typically consider each of these ownership 
types individually in their studies (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Nicholson & Salaber, 2013; Liu, Li & 
Xue, 2011), whereas, our work provides a comprehensive view of various types of ownership 
and Chinese firms diversification strategy.  
By building on a theoretical framework of economic and strategic arguments, we shed 
more light on the behavior of Chinese acquirers, which are important antecedents not captured 
in current studies. Thirdly, we also explore contextual factors such as the location of host 
countries, especially, the Chinese acquisitions of developed country targets. The impact of 
culture on Chinese cross-border acquisitions, especially in the acquisition of targets in 
developed economies like the US, has been studied by several authors (Nicholson & Salaber, 
2013; Dietz, Orr & Xing, 2008). In this paper, we further extend the argument on ownership 
identity in CMNEs’ diversification in foreign markets. Our work provides evidence that 
acquirer ownership identity is intricately linked to the target host country and will direct the 
acquirer’s diversification choice. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a 
theoretical framework and presents our hypotheses. In section 3, we document the 
methodology and data collection process. Section 4 provides a summary of results and findings. 
Section 5 concludes with a discussion.  
 
Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Chinese business context 
Before we delve into different types of ownership identities, it is important to note that 
ownership characteristics are hugely influenced by the institutional environment of the home 
country (Khanna & Palepu, 2000), and different types of firms might have different rationales 
for diversification strategies. Due to the heterogeneity of the home country context, we focus 
on China for the rest of the paper. The Chinese foreign direct investment has grown 
considerably over the last couple of decades (Berrill, 2015). Previous studies have looked at 
the underlying reasons for rapid internationalization by the Chinese firms (Child & Rodrigues, 
2005). One of the drivers for internationalization, according to Rui, and Yip (2008), is the 
intense competition between local companies and their global rivals. It has been suggested that 
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Chinese companies internationalize to address competitive disadvantages (Child & Rodrigues, 
2005). In some cases, these Chinese acquiring companies involved in manufacturing industry 
leverage competitive advantages derived from their low-cost domestic manufacturing to enter 
foreign markets (Rui & Yip, 2008). In other cases, the underlying motives for foreign 
investment by Chinese firms range from knowledge-seeking to resource-seeking, and these 
companies engage both in developed as well as developing economies for strategic reasons 
(Nicholson & Salaber, 2013). These rationales to internationalize would influence firms’ 
decision to engage in industrial diversification in foreign markets.  
 
The role of ownership in determining the decision to diversify into different industries in 
foreign markets 
The role of ownership structure and ownership identity play important functions in the decision 
to diversify. Ownership structure has been considered as a potential explanation for 
diversification (Hautz et al., 2013; Lane, Cannella Jr & Lubatkin, 1998). Also, ownership 
identity (i.e., type of owner) is considered as an essential mechanism to influence firm 
strategies, such as the decision whether to diversify outside the core industry. Ownership 
identity plays great role in the oversight and incentives management and influences corporate 
goals (Milhaupt & Zheng, 2014) and strategic choices (Ramaswamy, Li & Veliyath, 2002). 
For example, (Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson & Hitt, 2003) examine the relationship between 
institutional ownership, the board of directors and industrial diversification of firms in foreign 
markets within an agency framework. They argue that in the case of US firms, different types 
of institutional owners have different stakes in firms’ strategies, and contextual factors such as 
boards and technological opportunity accentuate these differences. Their results indicate that 
pension funds’ long-term orientation facilitate internationalization in industries with high 
technological opportunities. Therefore, we need to differentiate across different types of 
ownership. However, few studies have systematically examined crucial different ownership 
types in China. From the literature, we have identified three key ownership identities that might 
influence CMNEs. In this section, we will look at different types of ownership identities and 
explore their effects on foreign industry diversification, in the context of CMNEs.  
 
Government ownership 
Governments have long been acknowledged as critical sources of dependency for firms (Lester, 
Hillman, Zardkoohi & Cannella, 2008). The government can influence firms in several ways, 
such as directly taking ownership in SOEs, providing subsidies directly or using regulation and 
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policies. Compared to other forms of influence, direct government ownership or state 
ownership allows the extensive government control of operations. In the Chinese context, 
government ownership in national firms constitutes an integral part of the national economy. 
Despite their low numbers compared to a total number of businesses in China, government-
owned firms command high levels of assets as compared to total assets of all firms. According 
to a study by Huang, and Renyong (2014), in 2011 in China, only 5.2% of the total firms were 
state-owned firms, yet they controlled 41.68% of the total asset. Despite rapid liberalization of 
the Chinese economy, many Chinese companies holding significant industrial and financial 
assets are still majority controlled by the central and local government (Huang & Renyong, 
2014). In domestic acquisitions, authors have found that Chinese firms that are owned by the 
government are less likely to diversify across industries (Lin & Su, 2008). The benefits of 
industrial diversification were observed to be less in the case of government ownership of 
diversifying firms due to political costs of tunneling and expropriation. Recent studies also 
found that regarding valuation the diversified SOEs are valued less, thus, providing further 
evidence of political cost hypothesis of diversification (Lin & Su, 2008).  
Beyond the domestic context, the government ownership might also explain the targets 
that these Chinese companies pursue in their foreign acquisitions. State ownership might 
dictate the internationalization patterns and motives for cross-border acquisitions (Rui & Yip, 
2008). Government ownership could influence the behavior of these companies by filling in 
the institutional voids and facilitate internationalization activities such as foreign acquisitions 
by providing resources and capital (Inoue, Lazzarini & Musacchio, 2013; Ralston, Terpstra-
Tong, Terpstra, Wang & Egri, 2006). Thus, in this study, we go beyond the internationalization 
motives of CMNEs and query the influence of government ownership on a strategy of industrial 
diversification in foreign countries. 
Following the previous framework, we argue that regarding internationalization 
strategy, the government ownership might provide several reasonings for why the firms are 
less likely to undertake industrial diversification in foreign markets. Firstly, state companies 
usually follow national interests, not commercial logic. Some acquisitions by SOEs need to 
meet the national duties rather than further the strategic objectives of the firm. For example, 
Rui, and Yip (2008) propose that SOEs belonging to resource-intensive sectors typically 
acquire targets rich is natural resources to fulfill their obligations towards national tasks with 
the cost of acquiring the least of considerations. This is critical in sectors like oil and gas, where 
the foreign acquisitions were means of getting access to fuel resources and securing future 
access to natural resources. These transactions are not just restricted to just natural resources 
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but have also been seen in other industries. For example, the growth and expansion of state-
owned and controlled Chinese telecommunications companies can partly be attributed to their 
ties with the Chinese state. Companies such as ZTE are more likely to invest in related deals 
in Africa to build up local infrastructure (Li & Cheong, 2017). Hence, Chinese SOEs would 
seek foreign acquisitions in the same industrial sector to follow state directions.  
Secondly, the policies like “go global” will also have an impact on the globalization 
strategy by the Chinese government-owned firms (Luo & Tung, 2007; Cai, 1999; Deng, 2007; 
Chen & Findlay, 2003; Luo, Xue & Han, 2010; Singh, 2009; Sun, Peng, Ren & Yan, 2012). 
This is particularly true in the case of national champions which might be the first companies 
going abroad to fulfill the government’s globalization mandate (Wang, Hong, Kafouros & 
Boateng, 2012). Sun et al. (2012) confirm that Chinese SOEs play the leading role in cross-
border acquisitions. In these cases, the government ownership may provide opportunities and 
access to cheap finance which can increase the likelihood of foreign expansion, and at the same 
time, impel these firms to follow the government’s strategy. It is likely that in these 
circumstances, state firms are likely to acquire in the same industrial sector. 
Thirdly, in China, managers in SOEs are considered government officials. They tend to 
follow long-term orientation and have more conservative strategies compared to professional 
managers (Qian, 1996). One failure in a significant investment is likely to cost them their entire 
political career. So, managers in government-owned firms are less likely to follow high-risk-
high-reward investments. Also, SOEs might have additional performance expectations like 
generating employment, providing public goods and national security (Tan, 2001), all of which 
goals yield to a preference for less risky-taking behavior in international endeavors. The 
Chinese central bank governor has stated that "Some investments do not meet our industrial 
policy requirements for outward investment ... they are not of great benefit to China and have 
led to complaints abroad. Therefore, we think a certain degree of policy guidance is necessary 
and effective” (Feng, 2017).  Thus, managers in these firms will be encouraged to engage in 
value generating strategies, and probably, focus on their core industry to improve the national 
security mandate. As a business analyst states, "It’s clear Chinese regulators decided that ... 
they want to reassert the government gatekeeper role in to the outbound flow of investments" 
(Feng, 2017). Child, and Rodrigues (2005) have discussed the government restrictions on 
Chinese firm’s decision making. Nolan (2002) discusses the ambitions of the Chinese 
government to manage the internationalization process of its companies. As a consequence, if 
these managers perceive that diversification is likely to create political dissatisfaction they are 
unlikely to engage in unrelated diversification in their cross-border activities.  
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Therefore, the government ownership will reduce the chance of cross-industry 
acquisitions abroad, and we argue,  
Hypothesis 1. Government ownership of CMNEs will decrease the likelihood of their 
industrial diversification in cross-border acquisitions. 
 
Business group membership 
A business group is a set of legally independent firms ‘bound together by a constellation of 
formal and informal ties’ (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001) and coordinated by a central or core entity 
(Leff, 1978). According to the State Council of China, one of the primary objectives of forming 
business groups in China is to restructure large enterprises into cross-industry, cross-region 
business groups and transform them into national champions that can compete in both the 
domestic and global markets (Nolan, 2001; Yiu, 2011). The importance of business groups and 
business group membership in the emerging economies has been highlighted in various studies 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Lu & Yao, 2006; Kim, Hoskisson, Tihanyi 
& Hong, 2004; Maman, 2002; Gaur, Kumar & Singh, 2014). The ubiquitous presence of 
business groups is mostly an organizational response to strategic factor market and investor 
protection imperfections in developing economies (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Leff, 1978; 
Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006). In the absence of institutional intermediaries, business groups 
fill in the voids by generating their internal markets for financial capital and managerial talent 
(Ma, Yao & Xi, 2006).  
It has been observed that companies that are part of the business group in emerging 
economies are more likely to diversify across industries in their home country which authors 
have argued is due to their favorable position in the local political eco-system (Khanna & 
Yafeh, 2007). However, these observations have been made mostly for domestic acquisitions 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Lu & Yao, 2006), and have been linked to 
explanations like the market imperfections, survivability prowess, weak contract 
enforceability. Khanna, and Palepu (2000) argued that in India, business groups create an 
internal market and affiliation of the most diversified business groups outperformed 
unaffiliated firms. This applies equally to a country like China where the cost of capital is high 
for individual private or family-owned firm (Erdener & Shapiro, 2005; Huang & Renyong, 
2014; Ramasamy, Yeung & Laforet, 2010).  
 Authors have suggested that business group membership is likely to increase the chance 
of internationalization of a firm from emerging country (Gaur et al., 2014). Singh, and Gaur 
(2013) and Kumar, Gaur, and Pattnaik (2012) observe a positive effect of group affiliation on 
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foreign investments. Kumar et al. (2012) have examined the role of inherent trade-off between 
strategies of product and geographical diversification for Indian business groups. They suggest 
that, on average, business groups are less likely to pursue a strategy of product and geographical 
diversification as these domestically diversified firms are less likely to consider geographical 
diversification as one of their risk-reduction strategies. In the context of China, prior studies 
have documented that business group affiliations would fill ownership voids in China’s 
transition economy (Ma et al., 2006). Similar to government-owned CMNEs, Chinese business 
groups also faced a great deal of scrutiny of their strategies and internationalization activities 
from the Chinese government (Hahn & Lee, 2006). These business groups were expected not 
to expand or diversity extensively (Lee & Woo, 2001). Given these political pressures and the 
advantages of ownership control to business group’s core entity under weak investment 
protection regimes and the many risks of industrial diversification in foreign countries, business 
group’s core entity would rather avoid high costs of industrial diversification abroad. Based on 
these arguments, we propose that, 
Hypothesis 2. Business group membership of CMNEs will decrease the likelihood of 
their industrial diversification in cross-border acquisitions.  
 
Publicly-listed firms 
A few studies have looked at the differences between public listed firms (PLFs) and private 
acquirer firms regarding their internationalization strategy. It is not yet well documented 
whether the public status of emerging market acquirers will make a difference on a strategic 
decision such as industry diversification in the global context. In the context of CMNEs, we 
argue that PLFs and private firms have different characteristics and strategic decision-making 
process.  
To begin with, Initial Public Offering (IPO) process of Chinese companies will serve 
as an information-processing and asset valuation mechanism (Chen, 2004; Liu & Lu, 2007). 
IPO listing in Chinese stock exchange (Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange) is a very complicated process and requires fulfillment of various vital criteria1 
(Chen, 2004). Unlike stock exchanges in advanced countries which use a registration system, 
IPO in China cannot be launched on the mainland without passing an official assessment by 
regulator China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) (Pistor & Xu, 2005). This is an 
                                                          
1 http://english.sse.com.cn/listing/stocks/requirements/ 
http://www.sse.com.cn/marketservices/listing/tobelisted/listcondition/#1  
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extended evaluation system, and hundreds of companies need to queue up for months to get 
approved (Chen, 2004). So PLFs in China usually have better performance and necessity to 
sustain their profits compared to unlisted firms (Liu & Lu, 2007). Also, foreign investments 
might require access to capital and opportunities of Chinese firms to long-term debt is highly 
selective as it is provided by Chinese state bank (Xu, Xu & Yuan, 2013) and is strictly 
controlled by the state (Chen, 2004; Bai, Lu & Tao, 2006).  
Secondly, PLFs have stricter corporate governance mechanisms, a higher level of 
transparency and are subject to constant monitoring by both regulators and shareholders. On 
the one hand, the CSRC monitors all PLFs in great detail2. On the other, due to a higher level 
of transparency and liquidity, market feedback for public-listed acquirers is much better. 
Individual shareholders and institutional investors on the market will also provide additional 
monitoring on firm behavior by buying and selling shares (Liu & Lu, 2007). Thirdly, similar 
to the distinction in other countries, the process of strategic decision making is different for 
PLFs and private unlisted acquirers (Xu et al., 2013). The idea of a corporate board is not 
common in private companies (Chen, 2004), whereas public-listed companies usually require 
external board members to decide on essential internationalization decisions, making firms 
more likely to focus on significant synergy within the same industry and reduce agency costs 
and preference for unrelated deals. Lastly, whereas in advanced countries, there is an active 
managerial market, due to traditional Chinese culture and relationship-based management (Cai, 
2002), managers that misbehave in Chinese companies are less likely to find a new job. 
Creation of Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) in China adds to this 
atmosphere where corruption is viewed as a negative social and normative idea (Hornby, 2017). 
This behavioral aspect points to the convergence of interests between managers and 
shareholders.  
Taken together, we argue that compared to private firms, PLFs are less likely to 
diversify in international markets due to a higher level of firm monitoring by shareholders and 
additional monitoring by regulators. 
Hypothesis 3. Publicly-listed status of the CMNEs will decrease the likelihood of their 
industrial diversification in cross-border acquisitions.  
 
                                                          
2 www.csrc.gov.cn 
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Host country development 
The location choice of Chinese firms internationalizing also varies according to their ownership 
(Ramasamy et al., 2010). We are interested in examining whether different types of acquiring 
firms behave differently in developed and developing host countries and whether host country 
development will affect the decisions to diversify across CMNE’s core industry.  
Recent studies have suggested that cross-border acquisitions by emerging market 
acquirers differ significantly in developed and developing countries. For example, Nicholson, 
and Salaber (2013) find that both Chinese and Indian acquirers gain abnormal returns when the 
target firm is located in a developed country. This follows our earlier strategic argument that 
acquisitions in developed countries usually reflect the acquisition of complementary 
capabilities and strategic assets that are not available in the home country. Recent empirical 
studies such as Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, and Chittoor (2010) and Sun et al. (2012) support 
our conjecture that the acquirer’s emerging market home context will differ.  
The context is relevant in cases where the firms were internationalizing to escape their 
limited domestic market for advanced corporate governance or technological base. Authors 
have called this the “strategic exit” of Chinese companies (Boisot & Meyer, 2008). Acquiring 
a related target in advanced countries will enable the acquiring firms to tap into the technology 
and brand-name in the same industry. This can potentially create more economies of scale, and 
Chinese companies can benefit from synergies between different business units, especially this 
could help the transfer of critical capabilities like the managerial skills between foreign target 
firms and the Chinese companies. At the same time, given the stable institutional environment 
in the developed countries and the much more extensive market for corporate control, Chinese 
firms might easily adopt a risky stance of industrial diversification with the knowledge that 
there are likely to be future exit options for their investment if they do not derive synergies 
from their investments. 
Chinese SOEs are more liable to target risky political environments and seek access to 
natural resources (De Beule & Duanmu, 2012), whereas, the private firms are market-seekers 
and engage in less risky countries (Alden & Davies, 2006). On the other hand, SOEs will target 
advanced country targets to develop “national pride” by paying a higher premium. Regarding 
diversification strategy in foreign location by the business group affiliated firms, the underlying 
motivations for diversification like market imperfection and access to internal markets might 
not be relevant. This is particularly the case if the emerging market companies like those from 
China target developed economies like the US where the institutional frameworks are better 
developed to engage with contractual issues between the firms.  
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In contrast to firms in the advanced economies that enjoy relatively easy access to 
information, this is a particular issue for emerging market firms which face differential access 
to information on target companies, owing to institutional weaknesses and constraints in those 
markets. Similarly, there is limited information on the private CMNEs in the public domain 
which can be a significant issue in the developed markets. Much of the negative outlook on 
emerging market acquirers is linked to their opacity and lack of information in the global 
markets. Thus, publicly listed firms from China might experience openness and transactional 
flexibility while engaging in cross-border acquisitions and they can leverage this by targeting 
only firms in their sector but also across industry boundaries. This is very beneficial for Chinese 
firms in developed markets as they can acquire managerial skills not only relevant for their 
industry but via vertical integration can benefit from skills in other industries. Also, vertical 
integration and acquisitions across industries will help these firms protect their domestic 
markets via the acquisition of resources and competencies to manage global competition.  
Thus, we argue that host country will matter for these Chinese acquirers, and could 
impel them to engage in industrial diversification. 
Hypothesis 4a. The relationship between government ownership and decision to 
diversify across a firm’s core industry is moderated by host country level of 
development with developed markets having a positive impact on diversification by 
government-owned firms. 
Hypothesis 4b. The relationship between business group affiliation and decision to 
diversify across a firm’s core industry is moderated by host country level of 
development with developed markets having a positive impact on diversification by 
business group affiliated firms. 
Hypothesis 4c. The relationship between publicly-listed firms and decision to diversify 
across a firm’s core industry is moderated by host country level of development with 
developed markets having a positive impact on diversification by publicly-listed firms. 
The theoretical framework is briefly articulated in Figure 1. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Data and methodology 
Data collection 
The initial data set on cross-border acquisitions come from SDC Platinum, which is produced 
by Thomson Reuters Financial Securities Data. This database provides access to global 
financial market data and is widely used in studies on mergers and acquisitions and is 
extensively used by previous studies (Liou, Chao & Yang, 2016). We collected information on 
all completed Chinese cross-border deals and obtained 2000+ deals where Chinese bidders 
acquired some stakes in their targets during 1986 and 2014 (Buckley, Yu, Liu, Munjal & Tao, 
2016b).  Next, we cleaned the data for deals where the bidder owned a majority stake in the 
target company after the transaction (50% and over). Using this criterion helps us identify deals 
which involved considerable managerial and financial investment by the Chinese firms and we 
could confine our sample to non-portfolio deals. This considerably reduced our sample and we 
have 153 deals which belong to 16 host countries. This implies that most of the acquisitions 
(94%) by the Chinese firms are focused on portfolio development. The sample is limited by 
the availability of variables on the main deal and firm characteristics, and the sample at this 
stage is 125 deals which include both acquisitions in developed and developing countries. 
Table 1 illustrates the distribution of the country. Hong Kong has the most number of deals (51 
in total), followed by advanced nations such as United States (16 deals), Australia and Canada 
with 17 deals each.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Dependent variable 
We use the SDC Platinum database to identify if the acquirer and targets belonged to 
the same industry. The dummy variable, Diversification, takes value one if the target does not 
belong to the same industry as the bidder, and 0 otherwise. A firm’s core business is commonly 
defined as the business segment that generates the most significant revenue for the firm 
(Rumelt, 1974). Following existing literature, we define a firm’s core business industry as the 
four-digit US Primary Standard Industry Classification (SIC) industry. Acquisitions are 
classified as diversified if the acquiring firm is not in the same business segment as the target 
identified by four-digit SIC codes (Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005; Denis, Denis & Yost, 2002; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 2003). By checking for match of all four digits would imply testing for 
horizontal mergers between firms within the same primary economic activities (Barai & 
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Mohanty, 2014) or whether the deals are diversified deals.  Thus, deals which are not matched 
at the 4-digit level are deemed as unrelated diversification.  
We do acknowledge the limitations of this measure, including the lack of information 
on the percentage of sales from the diversified business. As Barai, and Mohanty (2014) have 
suggested, in emerging countries, the stricter definition of relatedness and diversification are 
more laborious to generate due to lack of data at the firm-level reporting. We also did our best 
to find alternative measures of diversification as detailed in the literature (Ramaswamy et al., 
2002; Sun, Peng & Tan, 2017; Nocker, Bowen, Stadler & Matzler, 2016; Li, He, Lan & Yiu, 
2012; Neffke, Henning & Boschma, 2011; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999), but we did not find 
consistent data for all the acquirers and targets in our sample. 
 
Independent variables and moderator 
We create three dummy variables to indicate the identity and type of majority owners. 
We created three mutually exclusive categories of ownership to avoid confounding our results 
between different kinds of ownership. We use a dummy variable, Acquirer government, to 
indicate whether the acquirer is government-owned enterprise or government is the majority 
stakeholder in this firm. We obtained this information from various sources like SDC Platinum, 
company website, annual filings and newspaper articles. This variable takes value one if there 
is evidence of government ownership or zero in other cases. The dummy variable, Acquirer 
business group, is used to indicate if the Chinese company is part of a business group. We used 
firm-level information from SDC Platinum database to classify our acquirers. This business 
group affiliated firm can be either government-owned business group or private business group. 
This variable takes the value one if true, 0 otherwise. Acquirer publicly listed is a dummy 
variable, and takes the value of 1 if the acquirer is a public-listed company or zero otherwise. 
All these variables are collected from the ownership data from Thomson one. We removed 
observations where firms evidenced multiple types of ownership. Following this cleaning, we 
had 90 observations in our sample. Also, as a proxy for the level of economic development in 
the host country, we have created a dummy variable (Target national development) which takes 
value one if the target country belongs to one of the developed countries as classified by the 
World Bank.  
 
Control variables  
We also include various controls for variation in the data arising from numerous sources: the 
deal-level, firm-level, sector-level and country-level differences. Firstly, we have included two 
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deal characteristics. The method of payment (cash or equity) may affect risk positions in the 
target. Regarding higher volatility and valuation problems, acquiring firms may use equity 
ownership instead of paying cash. Prior studies also document that cash payments are more 
likely in the same industry due to the familiarity of the industry environment. So, we control 
for a method of payment by including a dummy variable of cash (Linn & Switzer, 2001). Cash 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the acquisition is cash-financed, and zero otherwise.  
Percent acquired is the acquired stake in the target firms (Nicholson & Salaber, 2013; 
Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005). We expect that acquirers may take a higher percentage of 
stake in the same industry. Book/price Ratio is the book to market ratio of the target (Moeller 
& Schlingemann, 2005; Lang, Stulz & Walkling, 1991). A higher value is more likely to 
indicate that target is more valuable. This is relevant when considering diversification since 
companies need to consider the quality of potential targets.  
We also looked at whether the deal is a market-seeking move by the acquirer. Market 
Seek is included as a dummy variable and takes the value of one if host country GDP is higher 
than the home country in the year before the acquisition (Liou, Rao-Nicholson & Sarpong, 
forthcoming). GDP is usually used to measure the size of the host market. We would expect 
that in market-seeking deals, the acquirers will tend to prefer targets in the same industry, 
usually with distribution channels in this industry. To control for industry heterogeneity, we 
generate industry groups based on one-digit Primary US SIC codes. We clustered the deals by 
sectors to control for within industry heterogeneity.  
Further, we have included variables to control for cross-country differences. The 
general business environment such as legal, political, economic and social factors would 
influence firms’ decisions to diversify (Nicholson & Salaber, 2013; Ghemawat, 2001; Berry, 
Guillén & Zhou, 2010), so we control for several cross-country differences between China and 
the host countries. Historical links are included as a dummy variable and take value one if true, 
zero otherwise. In this case, historical links imply whether host country has a large number of 
Chinese diaspora or ethnic Chinese. Studies have shown that presence of ethnic ties can 
generate synergies in the international business (Jean, Tan & Sinkovics, 2011; Zaheer, Lamin 
& Subramani, 2009). For example, in Singapore, Chinese are the dominant ethnic group. 
Similarly, Jean et al. (2011) argue that despite decades since the relocation of Chinese in 
foreign countries, many of them still maintain close ties with their ancestral home. In the host 
country with historical links, the acquirer is more familiar with the host country environment. 
This variable also takes into account the possibility of round-tripping in Hong Kong. Legal 
distance is the difference of legal distance between the home (China) and host countries. 
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Economic distance indicates the difference of level of economic freedom between the home 
(China) and host countries. Both factors will potentially influence decision-making in foreign 
markets. Buckley, Forsans, and Munjal (2012) find that foreign investment varies with foreign 
exchange rate variation. The data on foreign exchange was obtained from Oanda website, and 
variable Foreign exchange is calculated as a ratio of acquirer and target currencies.  
 
Model specification and analysis  
To examine the relationships between the ownership identities and diversification we use probit 
regression analysis since the dependent variable is a binomial variable (Diversification). These 
regressions can be estimated by the maximum likelihood method. The model can be 
summarized as: 
Yn = bo + biXi + bjIj + bkCk + E  
where: Yn is the dependent variable, Xi stands for independent variables, Ij are the moderating 
variables, and Ck denotes control variables. The coefficients in Probit models cannot be 
interpreted directly, so we will use marginal effects and plot the interaction terms.  
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 includes information on the source and description of data for all variables. Table 3 
presents the descriptive statistics and distribution of the sample. In Table 3, 62 or (67%) of the 
92 deals involve industry diversification. The mean difference test shows that there is a 
significant difference between the diversification strategy adopted by the business group firms 
and publicly listed companies and these businesses are more likely to invest in their industry 
during internationalization.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 4 reports the correlation coefficients across all our variables. To analyze potential 
issues of multicollinearity, we analyze Variance Inflation Factors (VIF). The mean VIF 
reported is 2.44 and all scores are less than 4.44 (highest for the variable Target national 
development), far below the standard cut off point of 10 for multicollinearity (Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham & William, 1998). 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Results 
Table 5 presents estimates of Probit regressions. The Column (1) provides estimates of our 
baseline model which contains all our control variables. For the control variables, we find that 
the price to book ratio of the target (Book/Price Ratio) will have a positive effect on the 
diversification strategy of the Chinese companies, indicating that firms tend to acquire 
undervalued foreign assets, regardless of the industry. Historical links between the acquirer 
and target countries will negatively affect the decision to diversify implying that Chinese 
companies prefer to consolidate their industrial capabilities in these countries and choosing to 
diversify in historically unrelated countries.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
In Model 2 to Model 4 of Table 5, we have included direct effects of ownership on the 
likelihood of diversification into a different industry. The coefficient estimates from the main 
model demonstrate Chinese firms’ propensity to diversify in international acquisitions. The 
Pseudo R2 for our models lies between 0.186 and 0.242. The log likelihood ratios can be used 
in comparisons of nested models. Model 2 presents the results of H1. In Model 2, the p-value 
indicates that our model is statistically significant. The signs of Probit models are meaningful. 
We find out that government-owned is negatively linked to the propensity to diversify (β= -
1.000, significance at 1% level). Our findings lend support for Hypothesis 1 that government-
owned firms are less likely to diversify.  
Model 3 includes the results of business group membership. Business group 
membership is negatively correlated with the tendency to diversify (β= -0.992, significance at 
1% level), thus supporting our Hypothesis 2. The results in Model 4 indicate that the probability 
of unrelated acquisition into a different industry is negatively linked to publicly-listed acquirers 
(β= -1.459, significance at 1% level). So, we also supported our Hypothesis 3 on publicly-listed 
firms.  
The moderating effects of host country development status are tested in Model 5-8. The 
Pseudo R2s are between 0.210 and 0.431 (full model). The results of the empirical findings 
indicate that all types of ownership identity we captured here behave differently in developed 
and developing host countries. The host country interactions with government ownership (β= 
1.417, significance at 5% level), business group ownership (β= 1.316, significance at 10% 
level), and publicly listed firms (β= 1.665, significance at 5% level) are all positive, and 
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significant in case of direct effect variables. Thus, though publicly listed is not significant in 
the full model, rest of the ownership types are positively and significantly related to the host 
national development in explaining the international diversification strategy of the Chinese 
firms. 
To interpret the results of the interaction terms, we plot the interaction terms. In Figure 
2, we plotted the interaction terms for the host country and main ownership identities. 
Government-owned firms, a business group affiliated businesses and publicly listed firms are 
less likely to diversify in emerging markets.  
 
Additional analyses 
As a robustness check, this procedure has the advantage of studying acquirers that enter similar 
industries within the broad categorization. We include industry controls at two-digit SIC. We 
also conducted by splitting our samples between service and manufacturing firms and our 
results are robust to these sectoral differentiations. We also conducted another set of analysis 
by considering only those deals which were carried out after 2000. Our results for this sub-
sample are similar to those reported in this paper.  
 Next, as shown in Tables 6 & 7, we consider diversification at different levels of match 
of SIC-codes. We identify diversification at 1-digit, 2-digit and 3-digit levels. We observe from 
Tables 6 and 7 that most of our results are supported by this analysis. We find that at 1-digit 
diversification all interaction effects are significant.   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 and 7 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Since our main dependent variable is a binary variable, we also conducted additional 
analyses by constructing continuous variable to measure the level of industry diversification. 
Following prior studies, we generated a variable of diversification based on 4-digit primary 
SIC codes of the industry of the acquiring and target firms. Following similar studies such as 
Barai, and Mohanty (2014) and Haleblian, and Finkelstein (1999), we measured the level of 
diversification between the acquiring and target firms. Table 8a provides the details for 
generating the continuous variable for the level of diversification. Table 8b provides some 
descriptive statistics for this continuous variable 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 8a and 8b about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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The correlation between our dummy variable of diversification and the measurement 
of the level of diversification is 0.9239, indicating that our measurement is robust. We have 
also run all our models using this alternative measurement of the level of diversification, and 
the results are similar to those presented in the main model. The results for this robustness 
check have been included in Table 9. As the dependent variable is no longer a dummy variable 
and is truncated at the upper level value of four, we use tobit model in our analysis. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 9 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 We also used other measures for some of our controls. For example, we used GDP of 
the host country as an alternative measure of market seeking. Results of these analysis are 
similar to those presented in this paper. For historical links, we also looked at the strength of 
local activism of Chinese diaspora in the host countries to measure the current effect of the 
historical link. We created a dummy variable to indicate whether Chinese diaspora was 
engaged in organizing visits for trade delegations and hosting Chinese cultural events and these 
variables took value one if true and zero otherwise. Then, these individual values were 
combined to obtain the value for historical links. The analysis presented results which are 
similar to those presented in this paper.  
 
Discussion and conclusions  
In this paper, we examined the impacts of ownership identity and host country location as the 
possible determinants of the diversifying acquisitions undertaken by the Chinese firms. Though 
there are several studies that investigate the internationalization of the Chinese companies and 
their possible motives (Nicholson & Salaber, 2013; Rui & Yip, 2008; Luo & Tung, 2007; Child 
& Rodrigues, 2005; Cai, 1999; Deng, 2007; Chen & Findlay, 2003; Luo et al., 2010; Singh, 
2009; Sun et al., 2012; Deng, 2009), the impacts of heterogeneity in ownership identity among 
Chinese firms in foreign markets is rarely studied in the literature. Therefore, we combine the 
ownership literature with international business strategy literature to explain how ownership 
identities of Chinese companies have affected firms’ strategic decisions to diversify or not in 
foreign acquisitions. We argue that government ownership, membership of a business group 
and public-listed status will have negative impacts on the likelihood to diversify by the 
internationalizing Chinese companies. As suggested by the extant literature these companies 
face high pressure due to government interference, in the case of government-owned firms, and 
intervention by other business group member or hierarchical parent, in the case of business 
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group firms (Huang & Renyong, 2014; Deng, 2007). These competing objectives of the parent 
organization and government policies might drive the internationalization by the Chinese 
companies, and their choice of the target will be moderated by their ownership structure. 
According to institutional theorists, the legitimacy threats residing in the large national 
differences in the level of economic developments will determine resources available in the 
targets (Gubbi et al., 2010). Hence, emerging market companies would typically be expected 
to acquire in the same industry when entering advanced countries to explore new resources. 
One explanation for this observation could be the growing need for Chinese firms to improve 
and build their managerial capabilities and human capital within the firm’s boundaries. 
Acquiring target companies from a different background could help improve the organizational 
structure and corporate governance and combined with cross-industry characteristics this could 
imply that Chinese firms can move up or down the value chain and acquire capabilities in the 
upstream or downstream markets.  
Another argument for this observation could be that firms are motivated by 
government’s go global policy and access to cheap capital and are not strategic in their 
perspective on foreign acquisitions are willing to acquire targets in other sectors which in the 
long term could lead to integration problems, and in reality, have very little strategic value. 
ChemChina’s acquisition of Syngenta has been noted to be driven by “part of Beijing’s desire 
to improve food security, reduce reliance on foreign seed makers and develop an agribusiness 
industry” (Toplensky, 2017). We find that Chinese firms engage in consolidation activity and 
acquire companies that belong to their industry. One argument, similar to those presented in 
(Rui & Yip, 2008), could be that these firms acquire their competitors to pre-empt the likely 
competition in the Chinese domestic markets.  
 
Theoretical contributions  
We contribute to the theoretical discourse on cross-border industry diversification by 
presenting the international dimension. This work adds to the literature on international 
dimension to the industry diversification (Hautz et al., 2013), especially in the context of 
CMNEs. Next, we provide evidence on the role of ownership identity in the diversification 
strategy. Most of the prior works have considered these identities in partial terms and have 
explored one or combination of these types of ownership without examining them all in the 
same study (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Nicholson & Salaber, 2013; Liu et al., 2011), whereas, we 
consider these together in this paper. Furthermore, we also add host country location as an 
important dimension to this argument on international diversification of CMNEs. The impact 
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of culture on CMNEs has been studied by several authors (Nicholson & Salaber, 2013; Dietz 
et al., 2008) and we explore this from the perspective of both developing and developed 
markets. This paper provides evidence that acquirer ownership identity is closely associated 
with the host country and will direct the acquirer’s diversification options. 
 
Generalizability 
The specific context of our paper is China, where government ownership, business group and 
publicly listing are common. The sample and results reported here are typical of CMNEs. Our 
results indicate that different ownership identities in China have implications on industrial 
diversification in foreign markets. Some of the arguments (business group affiliation and 
public-listing status) are not context-specific and will apply to firms from other developing 
countries in the Asia Pacific Region. Thus, some of the results the study may be generalizable 
to other emerging economies with caution as these firms may share some characteristics with 
Chinese firms due to the prevalent institutional voids. For example, like China, business 
group play an important role in India (Gaur & Delios, 2015). Similarly, private companies 
going for public listing is a sign that a company had reached a certain threshold of size and 
profitability to attract public investors for additional funding. The stock exchange and 
investors would provide a monitoring role in other Asian countries is similar to China.  
 It is important to note that the results of Chinese SOEs may be different from SOEs 
from other democratic countries. Ramaswamy et al. (2002) argue that in the context of India, 
government agencies will not be related to diversification strategy. Although some of the risk-
averse arguments apply to the SOE literature in general (Boubakri, Cosset & Saffar, 2013), 
Chinese SOEs have certain characteristics that differ from Western SOEs and SOEs in other 
emerging countries. Peng (2005) summarizes and underscores the challenges of conducting 
research in China, especially in the context of state ownership and understanding its importance 
on firm performance in Chinese business context. We must be careful when generalizing the 
results to other emerging countries. As pointed out earlier, the effects of ownership on 
diversification is contextual upon the level of formal regulation and monitoring and informal 
information channels.  
 
Limitations and future research 
This paper is not without its limitations. Firstly, we focus only on the majority stake acquisition 
of Chinese firms. Minority stake ownership and potential use of real options perspective may 
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involve different points of view on risk-averse and the relationship between owners and foreign 
market decisions (Xu, Zhou & Phan, 2010). Though beyond the scope of this paper, future 
research could look at the whole set of Chinese cross-border acquisitions and maybe other types 
of investment, such as greenfield projects. We believe that our sample, which consists of 
culturally and geographically diverse host countries, does not bias the results presented in this 
paper, but having a sample of Chinese acquisitions that include both majority and a minority 
shareholding in all countries might provide a fine-grained view of the diversification strategy. 
 Secondly, we present limited information on the temporal differences that could emerge 
in the overseas acquisition strategy by the Chinese companies. Hence, future studies could 
focus on the changes that occur in the diversification strategy of the same firms over a period. 
Furthermore, we do not examine the performance implications of these diversifying 
acquisitions; hence, one of the future avenues for research would be to investigate the short-
term and long-term performance of diversification of Chinese firms in foreign markets.  
 Another key limitation is the lack of data on non-core businesses for all the acquirer 
and targets. We had data on this for less than 10% of our sample and all the other acquirer and 
target firms listed only one primary SIC code. This is precisely the idiosyncratic nature of this 
data set. In future studies, authors can identify this information by either carrying out a survey 
of the managers of the firms involved in foreign acquisitions or creating a much smaller sample 
of deals which includes the data on firm-level non-core businesses. Similarly, many of the 
suggested diversification indices used in the prior literature are hard to create for geographical 
and industrial diversification due to the nature of our data. Also, though the diversification 
measured used in this study provided us with a granular view of diversification, it is not without 
its limitations. Currently, we consider all firms belonging to the different industry as equals. 
We know in reality this is far from accurate, some industries might be more related than some 
others. Nevertheless, we argue that our paper provides a more nuanced view of how firms in 
different industries might consider ownership levels in their targets in foreign markets.  
Similarly, various studies suggest the importance of evaluating the social integration 
process in the cross-border acquisitions (Liu & Woywode, 2013), future studies could look at 
the challenges in the same host countries by Chinese firms acquiring in different sectors. These 
nuanced studies will help distinguish the underlying reasons for diversification between 
emerging and advanced host markets as well as differences observed between industrial 
sectors.  
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Managerial relevance  
The findings of the current study demonstrate a systematic way of understanding the 
diversification strategy adopted by Chinese multinational firms. For this research, we look at 
single country acquirers who have acquired majority shares in targets around the world. We 
find support for our hypotheses that the ownership types provide a reasonable and robust 
explanation of the diversification strategy adopted by the Chinese firms.  
We also observe that in developed host markets Chinese firms are more willing to 
engage in diversification strategy. This might indicate that CMNEs adopt a strategy of vertical 
integration or diversifying into industries which might benefit from their existing competencies 
and skills. This will help strengthen their global brand as well as establish a presence in 
developed markets. At the same time, building synergies in the developed market will help 
CMNEs counter some of the potential domestic rivalry arising from their developed country 
competitors as they enter China. Thus, we argue our results indicate the domestic market 
protection strategies adopted by the Chinese companies for mitigating competition from their 
developed market rivals. As CMNEs enter foreign markets, they might also want to establish 
strategies that protect their existing home markets, and this is relevant since China is rapidly 
opening its industries to foreign entry and removing restrictions previously observed in its 
domestic markets. Thus, CMNEs can choose to be strategic and benefit from well-developed 
institutions in these advanced economies, while still protecting their home market share.  
Managers of Chinese companies, also potentially by extension other emerging market 
firms, can benefit from understanding this nuanced view of investing in advanced markets. 
These managers can focus on extending their domestic strengths via related industry 
acquisitions in other developing countries and focus on expanding via vertical integration in 
the advanced markets. Thus, managers are advised to take into consideration their ownership 
status and account for both home and host country business environments while making 
strategic decisions about acquiring in foreign markets.  
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Figure 1. Conceptual Framework of ownership types and propensity to diversify 
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Figure 2. Moderating effect of target national development on the relationship between 
the Ownership status and propensity to diversify
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Table 1. Country and year-wise distribution of deals 
Target 
Nations 
198
6 
198
8 
198
9 
199
2 
199
3 
199
4 
199
5 
199
7 
199
8 
199
9 
200
0 
200
1 
200
2 
20
04 
20
05 
200
6 
200
7 
200
8 
200
9 
201
0 
201
1 
201
2 
201
3 
201
4 
Grand 
Total 
Australia 
 
   
    
1 
       
2 2 3 2 3 2 2 
 
17 
Canada 
 
   
     
1 
   
1 1 
 
1 4 2 2 4 1 
  
17 
Germany 
 
   
         
1 
          
1 
Hong Kong 1  1 1 2 1 1 3 
  
5 2 2 3 4 1 1 8 3 4 3 2 1 2 51 
Israel                    1     1 
Japan 
 
   
         
1 
 
1 
        
2 
Netherlands 
 
   
          
1 
         
1 
New 
Zealand 
 
   
  
1 
                 
1 
Russian Fed                1         1 
Singapore 
 
   
            
1 1 2 1 1 
   
6 
South Korea 
 
   
         
1 
   
1 
      
2 
South 
Africa  
   
                1    1 
Switzerland 
 
   
                
1 
   
1 
Thailand                   1 1     2 
United 
Kingdom 
 
   
          
1 
 
2 
    
1 1 
 
5 
United 
States 
 
1   
   
1 1 
     
1 
 
1 3 2 3 1 1 1 
 
16 
Grand 
Total 1 
1 1 1 
2 1 2 4 2 1 5 2 2 7 8 3 7 19 13 14 14 7 5 2 125 
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Table 2. Definition and source of variables 
Variable name Definition Source 
Diversification Dummy = 1 if target belongs to different 
industry than the bidder when compared 
at 4-digit level, 0 otherwise 
SDC Platinum database 
Acquirer government 
Dummy = 1 if fully government-owned 
or government majority stakeholder, 0 
otherwise 
SDC Platinum database 
Acquirer business 
group 
Dummy = 1 if company is part of a 
business group, 0 otherwise 
SDC Platinum database 
Acquirer publicly listed 
Dummy = 1 if acquirer is a public 
company, 0 otherwise 
SDC Platinum database 
Target national 
development 
Dummy = 1 if World Bank lists target 
country as developed country, , 0 
otherwise World Bank 
Book/price Ratio Bidder's price-to-book ratio of the target SDC Platinum database 
Market seeking 
Dummy = 1 if GDP(target) > 
GDP(China), , 0 otherwise 
World Bank 
Percentage acquired 
Percentage of shares acquired in the 
transaction 
SDC Platinum database 
Cash 
Dummy = 1 if cash-financed deal, 0 
otherwise 
SDC Platinum database 
Historical links 
Dummy = 1 if country has historical 
links with China, 0 otherwise 
National census 
website, newspaper, 
country information 
website like the CIA 
website 
Legal distance 
Target legal and regulatory framework 
index/ Acquirer legal and regulatory 
framework index 
legal and regulatory 
framework file from 
IMD WYC executive 
survey 
Economic distance 
The composite index for economic 
freedom 
Heritage Foundation 
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Foreign exchange 
The relative strength of the exchange 
rate is calculated as the deviation of the 
foreign exchange rate at announcement 
date from its 12-month average. 
Oanda website 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Variable 
Undiversified  
(n = 30) 
Diversified 
(n = 62) 
Mean Difference (t-
statistics) 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Acquirer government 0.44 0.44 0.48 0.47 0.06 
 
0.706 
Acquirer business group 0.40 0.50 0.17 0.37 0.26 *** 2.8416 
Acquirer publicly listed 0.43 0.50 0.14 0.35 0.33 *** 3.5645 
Target national 
development 0.46 0.51 0.49 0.50 
   
Book/price Ratio 3.45 7.38 4.34 28.21 
   
Market seeking 0.74 0.44 0.72 0.45 
   
Percentage acquired 60.92 33.80 59.59 32.06 
   
Cash 0.63 0.49 0.53 0.50 
   
Historical links 0.46 0.51 0.47 0.50 
   
Legal distance 1.31 0.32 1.30 0.32 
   
Economic distance 1.56 0.18 1.58 0.14 
   
Foreign exchange 3.30 13.27 2.62 16.36 
   
*** p<0.01, non-missing values included in this table 
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Table 4. Pearson correlation coefficients 
 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Diversification 0.68 0.05 1 
           
2 
Acquirer 
government 0.69 0.46 
-0.064 1 
          
3 
Acquirer 
business group 0.23 0.42 
-0.248*** -0.337*** 1 
         
4 
Acquirer publicly 
listed 0.25 0.41 
-0.306*** 0.147 -0.023 1 
        
5 
Target national 
development 0.48 0.50 
0.029 -0.096 -0.111 -0.017 1 
       
6 Book/price Ratio 4.26 2.44 0.017 0.06 -0.051 0.165 -0.0567 1 
      
7 Market seeking 0.71 0.05 -0.021 -0.13 0.123 -0.06 -0.636*** 0.057 1 
     
8 
Percentage 
acquired 59.13 3.31 
-0.018 -0.131 -0.097 -0.061 0.061 0.144 -0.303*** 1 
    
9 Cash 0.63 0.05 -0.086 0.115 -0.124 0.128 -0.019 -0.124 -0.288*** 0.088 1 
   
10 Historical links 0.45 0.05 0.009 0.057 0.135 -0.192** 0.670*** -0.128 0.569*** -0.437*** -0.145 1 
  
11 Legal distance 1.34 0.03 -0.02 0.116 -0.016 -0.099 0.381*** -0.328*** -0.05 -0.407*** 0.3*** 0.288*** 1 
 
12 
Economic 
distance 1.58 0.01 
0.069 0.089 0.083 -0.222** 0.414*** -0.455*** 0.129 -0.414*** 0.063 0.561*** 0.717*** 1 
13 
Foreign 
exchange 3.10 1.72 
-0.020 -0.086 -0.067 0.153*** -0.137 0.078 0.105 -0.161* 0.015 -0.082 -0.337*** -0.281*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 5. Probit Regression Results for dependent variable Diversification. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Controls Direct effect Direct effect Direct effect Interaction Interaction Interaction Full model 
VARIABLES         
Main effects         
Acquirer government (H1)  -1.000***   -1.633***   -2.694*** 
 (0.333)   (0.452)   (0.750) 
Acquirer business group (H2)   -0.992***   -1.533***  -2.766*** 
  (0.362)   (0.560)  (0.675) 
Acquirer publicly listed (H3)    -1.459***   -2.435*** -2.269*** 
   (0.406)   (0.648) (0.775) 
Interaction terms         
Host country development     -1.392 -0.376 -1.194 -3.328*** 
     (0.856) (0.720) (0.801) (1.287) 
Acquirer government * Host country development (H4a)     1.417**   1.946** 
    (0.670)   (1.111) 
Acquirer business group * Host country development (H4b)      1.316*  2.181** 
     (0.754)  (1.070) 
Acquirer publicly listed * Host country development (H4c)       1.665** 1.447 
      (0.778) (0.936) 
Controls         
Percent acquired 0.0008 -0.00178 -0.00171 -0.00472 4.72e-05 -0.00338 -0.00479 -0.00874 
 (0.0057) (0.00587) (0.00576) (0.00598) (0.00635) (0.00614) (0.00631) (0.00780) 
Cash -0.2866 -0.139 -0.347 -0.0453 -0.359 -0.373 0.0425 -0.110 
 0.3294 (0.333) (0.353) (0.356) (0.357) (0.381) (0.369) (0.422) 
Book/price Ratio 0.0109* 0.0127* 0.0109* 0.00870 0.0135** 0.0101 0.00979 0.0144** 
 (0.0065) (0.00663) (0.00621) (0.00636) (0.00643) (0.00622) (0.00641) (0.00602) 
Market seeking  -0.2600 -0.630 -0.205 -0.189 -0.334 -0.413 -0.184 -0.875 
 (0.4350) (0.471) (0.447) (0.431) (0.577) (0.516) (0.525) (0.741) 
Historical links  -0.1824 -0.0353 -0.155 -0.577 -0.467 -0.0557 -1.241* -1.430* 
 (0.5316) (0.519) (0.569) (0.544) (0.606) (0.640) (0.699) (0.786) 
Legal distance 0.3336 0.627 0.0148 0.607 0.117 -0.236 -0.908 -1.179 
 (1.1764) (1.243) (1.173) (1.174) (1.524) (1.504) (1.695) (2.228) 
Economic distance 1.6320 1.030 1.497 0.606 2.318 1.356 3.059 3.708 
 (2.2683) (2.416) (2.208) (2.159) (2.788) (2.666) (2.927) (3.459) 
Foreign exchange  0.0066 0.00397 0.00223 0.00723 -0.00141 -0.000841 0.00204 -0.0147 
rate change (0.0093) (0.00897) (0.00947) (0.00976) (0.0103) (0.0107) (0.0110) (0.0124) 
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Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.4663 -1.198 -1.407 -0.943 -1.679 -0.470 -1.446 1.364 
 (2.5589) (2.607) (2.522) (2.425) (2.855) (2.569) (2.507) (3.027) 
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 
Log likelihood -51.63 -48.40 -48.29 -45.08 -46.97 -47.01 -43.29 -33.79 
Pseudo R square 0.131 0.186 0.188 0.242 0.210 0.209 0.272 0.431 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 6. Robustness check - Probit Regression Results for diversification at 3-digit level.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Direct effect Direct effect Direct effect Interaction Interaction Interaction Full model 
Main effects        
Acquirer government (H1) -0.959***   -2.292***   -5.159*** 
 (0.341)   (0.620)   (0.956) 
Acquirer business group (H2)  -0.981**   -1.410**  -4.506*** 
  (0.389)   (0.630)  (0.610) 
Acquirer publicly listed (H3)   -1.456***   -2.927*** -1.928** 
   (0.430)   (0.923) (0.963) 
Interaction terms        
Host country development    -5.635*** -3.130* -5.620*** -9.949*** 
    (1.947) (1.702) (1.894) (2.108) 
Acquirer government * Host 
country development (H4a) 
   1.977***   3.627** 
    (0.759)   (1.459) 
Acquirer business group * Host 
country development (H4b) 
    0.927  3.061** 
     (0.808)  (1.214) 
Acquirer publicly listed * Host 
country development (H4c) 
     2.104** 0.967 
      (0.992) (1.133) 
Controls        
Percent acquired -0.00685 -0.00506 -0.00686 -0.00731 -0.00522 -0.00672 -0.0138 
 (0.00653) (0.00649) (0.00645) (0.00736) (0.00647) (0.00660) (0.00869) 
Cash 0.0701 -0.226 0.0584 -0.316 -0.432 0.0476 -0.158 
 (0.350) (0.380) (0.374) (0.366) (0.405) (0.380) (0.482) 
Book/price Ratio 0.0120* 0.0101 0.00910 -0.00121 -0.00191 -0.00742 -0.0154 
 (0.00659) (0.00619) (0.00619) (0.0103) (0.00970) (0.0114) (0.0132) 
Market seeking  -0.568 -0.153 -0.137 -1.735** -1.388* -1.513** -2.621*** 
 (0.478) (0.447) (0.445) (0.790) (0.732) (0.741) (0.905) 
Historical links  0.617 0.465 -0.0592 0.760 0.831 -0.316 0.196 
 (0.561) (0.613) (0.631) (0.803) (0.767) (0.844) (0.971) 
Legal distance 1.172 0.720 1.287 -1.382 -0.873 -1.986 -1.905 
 (1.311) (1.312) (1.300) (1.792) (1.629) (1.763) (2.258) 
Economic distance -3.115 -2.718 -2.853 -9.360 -8.099 -9.784 -14.75** 
 (3.018) (3.081) (3.093) (5.693) (5.080) (6.269) (7.149) 
Foreign exchange  -0.511** -0.431** -0.375 -1.834*** -1.295** -1.847*** -1.941*** 
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rate change (0.216) (0.205) (0.245) (0.670) (0.632) (0.641) (0.509) 
 4.853 4.463 3.553 24.80** 19.03* 25.57** 40.00*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant (3.808) (3.932) (3.831) (11.06) (9.782) (11.11) (11.86) 
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 
Log likelihood -45.55 -45.26 -42.35 -39.80 -42.47 -37.62 -27.37 
Pseudo R square 0.241 0.246 0.295 0.337 0.293 0.373 0.544 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 7. Robustness check - Probit Regression Results for diversification at 2-digit and 1-digit levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
VARIABLES 2-digit diversification 1-digit diversification 
 Direct 
effect 
Direct 
effect 
Direct 
effect 
Interaction Interaction Interaction Full 
model 
Direct 
effect 
Direct 
effect 
Direct 
effect 
Interaction Interaction Interaction Full 
model 
Main effects                
Acquirer 
government 
(H1) 
-1.522***   -6.271**   -7.653*** -
2.203*** 
  -16.55   -
17.90*** 
 (0.469)   (2.769)   (1.258) (0.683)   (0)   (1.320) 
Acquirer 
business 
group (H2) 
 -0.668   -1.493**  -5.623***  -0.258   -0.810  -
11.43*** 
  (0.437)   (0.643)  (0.913)  (0.429)   (0.644)  (1.174) 
Acquirer 
publicly 
listed (H3) 
  -1.002**   -2.507*** -1.774**   -0.894**   -3.456*** -2.256** 
   (0.407)   (0.670) (0.808)   (0.418)   (0.878) (0.911) 
Interaction 
terms 
              
Host country 
development 
   -6.366** -0.165 -1.045 -8.148***    -15.93*** 0.226 -1.566 -
18.19*** 
    (3.178) (0.771) (0.970) (1.371)    (1.071) (0.861) (1.118) (1.164) 
Acquirer 
government * 
Host country 
development 
(H4a) 
   5.529**   6.594***    15.46***   16.93*** 
    (2.649)   (1.354)    (0.925)   (1.379) 
Acquirer 
business 
group * Host 
country 
development 
(H4b) 
    2.012**  5.912***     1.362  17.24*** 
     (0.888)  (1.272)     (0.854)  (1.742) 
Acquirer 
publicly 
     2.484*** 1.779      3.646*** 2.465** 
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listed * Host 
country 
development 
(H4c) 
      (0.827) (1.092)      (1.037) (1.222) 
Controls               
Percent 
acquired 
-0.0106 -0.00569 -0.00694 -0.0130* -0.00824 -0.00728 -0.0163* -0.00999 -0.00149 -0.00323 -0.0120 -0.00298 -0.00345 -0.0113 
 (0.00689) (0.00645) (0.00656) (0.00746) (0.00651) (0.00703) (0.00836) (0.00802) (0.00639) (0.00657) (0.00886) (0.00643) (0.00686) (0.00909) 
Cash -0.102 -0.357 -0.175 -0.203 -0.433 -0.0651 -0.601 0.428 0.0852 0.239 0.545 0.0592 0.413 0.274 
 (0.387) (0.370) (0.376) (0.420) (0.409) (0.418) (0.529) (0.407) (0.362) (0.379) (0.479) (0.379) (0.438) (0.504) 
Book/price 
Ratio 
0.0254*** 0.0217*** 0.0211*** 0.0257*** 0.0213*** 0.0267*** 0.0351*** 0.0395* 0.0222*** 0.0220*** 0.0440** 0.0223*** 0.0378*** 0.0337 
 (0.00833) (0.00646) (0.00648) (0.00861) (0.00655) (0.00753) (0.00807) (0.0236) (0.00641) (0.00633) (0.0195) (0.00646) (0.0135) (0.0350) 
Market 
seeking  
-0.441 0.126 0.110 -0.428 -0.0265 0.377 -0.604 -0.444 0.369 0.409 0.0439 0.396 0.882 0.255 
 (0.518) (0.465) (0.459) (0.842) (0.586) (0.673) (0.964) (0.567) (0.448) (0.469) (1.043) (0.573) (0.681) (1.223) 
Historical 
links  
-0.0965 -0.321 -0.671 0.101 -0.157 -1.499* -1.064 0.0519 -0.725 -1.193 0.764 -0.675 -2.550** -2.553 
 (0.644) (0.662) (0.644) (0.780) (0.668) (0.795) (0.881) (1.109) (0.696) (0.763) (1.420) (0.676) (1.269) (3.439) 
Legal 
distance 
-0.567 -0.974 -0.605 -1.758 -1.054 -2.040 -1.502 0.236 -0.472 -0.263 -0.421 -0.271 -1.378 -0.791 
 (1.331) (1.149) (1.116) (1.672) (1.446) (1.645) (2.093) (1.462) (1.151) (1.121) (1.686) (1.462) (1.732) (2.292) 
Economic 
distance 
5.174 5.221* 5.184* 3.371 5.323** 8.983*** 8.475** 4.396 4.190 4.568 0.0134 4.585 10.14*** 7.378 
 (3.416) (2.933) (2.871) (3.064) (2.611) (3.329) (4.201) (4.086) (2.931) (2.958) (3.454) (2.796) (3.758) (5.411) 
Foreign 
exchange  
-0.227 -0.142 -0.0875 -0.958* -0.0451 -0.0693 -0.584* -1.187 -0.324 -0.223 -2.552* -0.114 -0.750 -0.530 
 (0.320) (0.220) (0.255) (0.554) (0.0532) (0.499) (0.307) (1.235) (0.304) (0.327) (1.517) (0.387) (1.086) (3.242) 
Year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -4.790 -5.478 -6.143 6.139 -5.432* -9.184** 0.0929 -6.511 -6.686* -7.615* 12.62** -8.024* -13.51*** -3.821 
 (4.591) (4.044) (3.940) (6.388) (3.264) (4.505) (6.052) (5.653) (4.061) (4.168) (5.604) (4.384) (5.220) (21.77) 
Observations 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 
Log 
likelihood 
-42.10 -46.86 -45.24 -38.17 -44.33 -41.77 -27.87 -38.20 -49.14 -46.96 -31.84 -47.92 -42.29 -24.15 
Pseudo R 
square 
0.269 0.186 0.214 0.337 0.230 0.275 0.516 0.352 0.166 0.203 0.460 0.187 0.282 0.590 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 8a. Generating level of diversification for robustness checks 
Match Level of diversification 
All 4 digits of primary SIC codes match Diversification=0 
First 3 digits of primary SIC codes match Diversification=1 
First 2 digits of primary SIC codes match Diversification=2 
First 1 digit of primary SIC codes match Diversification=3 
0 primary SIC codes match Diversification=4 
 
Table 8b. Level of diversification based on Primary SIC codes 
Level of 
diversification  Freq. Percentage % 
Cumulative 
percentage 
0 35 28 28 
1 1 0.8 28.8 
2 13 10.4 39.2 
3 12 9.6 48.8 
4 64 51.2 100 
Total 125 100  
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Table 9. Results for continuous diversification variable using tobit model.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Direct 
effect 
Direct 
effect 
Direct 
effect 
Interaction Interaction Interaction Full 
model 
Acquirer 
government (H1) 
-1.318***   -2.123***   -2.148*** 
 (0.309)   (0.398)   (0.345) 
Acquirer business 
group (H2) 
 -0.922**   -1.722**  -1.739*** 
  (0.462)   (0.669)  (0.336) 
Acquirer publicly 
listed (H3) 
  -
1.399*** 
  -2.517*** -1.830*** 
   (0.415)   (0.500) (0.478) 
Host country 
development 
   -1.330 -0.243 -1.074 -2.586*** 
    (0.878) (0.766) (0.839) (0.762) 
Acquirer 
government * Host 
country 
development (H4a) 
   1.714***   1.617** 
    (0.554)   (0.639) 
Acquirer business 
group * Host 
country 
development (H4b) 
    1.807**  1.728** 
     (0.824)  (0.714) 
Acquirer publicly 
listed * Host 
country 
development (H4c) 
     2.065*** 1.368* 
      (0.758) (0.769) 
Percent acquired -0.00354 -0.00185 -0.00503 -0.00239 -0.00529 -0.00561 -0.0109* 
 (0.00652) (0.00638) (0.00648) (0.00718) (0.00654) (0.00652) (0.00610) 
Cash -0.109 -0.286 -0.00949 -0.277 -0.240 0.0366 -0.0824 
 (0.335) (0.365) (0.366) (0.352) (0.387) (0.385) (0.305) 
Book/price Ratio 0.0206*** 0.0189*** 0.0164** 0.0208*** 0.0183*** 0.0170*** 0.0178*** 
 (0.00630) (0.00570) (0.00638) (0.00561) (0.00582) (0.00589) (0.00455) 
Market seeking  -0.294 0.0166 -0.00735 0.0611 -0.0850 -0.0338 -0.223 
 (0.478) (0.484) (0.436) (0.563) (0.580) (0.584) (0.524) 
Historical links  -0.501 -0.427 -0.737 -0.856 -0.262 -1.059* -1.139** 
 (0.573) (0.577) (0.508) (0.624) (0.611) (0.556) (0.500) 
Legal distance -0.140 -0.560 -0.281 -0.276 -0.626 -1.895 -2.070 
 (1.293) (1.261) (1.190) (1.723) (1.575) (1.697) (1.537) 
Economic distance 3.925* 4.003* 3.123 4.418 3.433 5.041* 4.594* 
 (2.311) (2.126) (2.017) (2.875) (2.595) (2.698) (2.498) 
Foreign exchange  -0.0129 -0.0115 -0.00770 -0.0173* -0.0148 -0.0118 -
0.0293*** 
 (0.00826) (0.00939) (0.00955) (0.00982) (0.0102) (0.0108) (0.00902) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.547 -2.783 -1.730 -2.549 -1.649 -1.295 1.657 
 (2.510) (2.347) (2.253) (2.699) (2.234) (2.157) (2.204) 
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Log likelihood -177.8 -181.7 -178.4 -174.9 -179.3 -175.2 -159.7 
Pseudo R square 0.109 0.0891 0.106 0.123 0.101 0.122 0.199 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
